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ABSTRACT
Mutual causation of predation and trade induces novel effects of commercial policy in this paper. The
model can explain trade volume responses to market widening initiatives that are otherwise puzzlingly
'too big' or 'too small'. Efficient commercial policy (broadly defined) depends crucially on the strength
of enforcement. Externalities arising between traders are normally internalized by subsidizing (taxing)
trade when enforcement is weak (strong). Efficient regional policy squeezes weak enforcement markets
while subsidizing strong enforcement markets. Tolerance (intolerance) of smuggling is rational when
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james.anderson.1@bc.eduCommerce is subject to substantial predation. Ocials demand bribes,
port workers require payments o the books, petty theft is common, hijack-
ing occurs in some locations. Africa provides spectacular examples. The
Economist (Dec. 19, 2002) reports the story of a beer truck that loses 1/3 of
its load to extortionists at 47 roadblocks along 313 miles of road from Douala
to Bertoua in Cameroon.
Moving from anecdote to data, Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1997) re-
port survey evidence that corruption (ocial extortion) is ranked second only
to taxation as an obstacle to business. Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) pro-
vide econometric evidence that insecurity reduces trade. For example they
argue that insecurity is as destructive of trade to Latin American countries
as are their protectionist trade policies.
While trade is reduced by predation, predation may also respond to trade.
Mixed evidence on the success of trade liberalizations suggests two way cau-
sation between trade and (hidden) trade costs.1 Two way causation is also
suggested by evidence that the quality of institutions has no simple rela-
tionship to income per capita. Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) report a
composite security score for 48 countries in 1996, reproduced below as Table
2 from that paper. Italy ranks below India and Indonesia despite despite
being much richer, while the US and Spain are far from the top despite their
wealth.
Commercial policy in this paper is interpreted to include market widening
or narrowing policies such as terms of access to and provision of infrastruc-
ture.2 Commercial policy has complex interactions with security in a world
with predators. On the one hand, predation or the threat of predation may
reduce or prevent trade expansion that would otherwise occur. On the other
hand, liberalization may improve security as expanded trade draws erstwhile
predators into legitimate activity. These forces suggest that trade gener-
1Some regional agreements such as NAFTA create much more intra-regional trade
than standard models predict (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2002), while others produce
disappointingly little. Schi and Winters (2003, p. 32) review 9 episodes of developing
country regional agreements, of which 2 decreased trade and 2 others increased trade
very modestly. Schi and Winters report more sophisticated evaluation of the eect of
regional agreements, with much the same conclusions. The Central American Common
Market (CACM) has a particularly interesting history. In its rst form it increased trade
spectacularly between 1960 and 1970, trade fell in the 70's following on the outbreak of
civil war and the agreement eventually died. The reestablishment of the CACM in 1991
led to a modest increase in intra-regional trade.
2This denition was the common usage of the era of the classical economists.ates externalities. Ecient commercial policy in an insecure world should
internalize the externality that ows between trade and security.
Traders and predators being legendarily footloose, commercial policy in
one market is likely to generate an externality on other markets that is dis-
tinct from the usual terms of trade externality. Also, the security externality
travels between legitimate markets and those for smuggled goods, suggesting
that internalization may involve tolerance or intolerance for smuggling.
This paper develops a model of trade and commercial policy in a preda-
tory world to address these questions. The model is based on Anderson
and Bandiera (2006). The dramatis personae of the model are merchants,
traders, and predators.3 Trade requires labor drawn from the same pool as
predators.4 Merchants provide the capital required to carry on trade. They
may form a guild that controls the volume of trade.5
The familiar language of international trade theory is used to describe
commercial policy, but the model applies to regional policy as well, and the
externalities acting between markets are likely to be more powerful for regions
within countries. Commercial policy is modeled as taxes or subsidies to trade
but should be interpreted as including terms of access to infrastructure.
Enforcement is taken as exogenous. Many aspects of enforcement are slow
moving with respect to commercial policy and trade volume, so the setup has
3Like Tom Stoppard's Rosenkrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead, which moves the ac-
tions in Shakespeare's Hamlet ostage while the ostage action moves onstage, the action
of standard trade theory moves ostage while the merchants, predators and traders move
onstage. I am in debt to Avinash Dixit for elaborating this analogy.
4British seaports in the age of Napoleon provide an example. In historical ction of
Patrick O'Brian, the port towns of the southwest coast of England provided labor markets
for sailors who could choose to work on legitimate commercial ships, privateers (who
sometimes preyed on British ships as well as their legitimate French prey), or smugglers.
Internationally, such sailors could locate in pirate ports of the Caribbean from any original
home port. Ship's crews in long distance trade were commonly quite heterogeneous in
nationality. Legendarily meticulous in his research, O'Brian reportedly was consulted as
an authority by professional historians of the period.
Modern ports similarly provide a venue for trade services workers who can also act as
predators, stealing cargo or imposing delays on shippers unless bribes are paid to expedite
the movement of goods.
5There is some evidence that monopoly power may be important in trade services.
US agricultural trade is dominated by a monopolist while much trade in manufactures
is carried on by distributers owned by or closely tied to monopolistically competitive
rms. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) note that apparent markups vary inversely with
elasticities of substitution, consistent with monopoly power.
2a short run rationale and permits a clear focus on the many interesting issues
of commercial policy in a predatory world. For treatment of enforcement that
is endogenous to commercial policy and trade volume, see Anderson (2008).
The qualitative features of this paper remain valid.
Section 1 sets out the analysis. Competitive merchants impose two ex-
ternalities on each other. A positive externality, safety in numbers, arises
because a marginal expansion of trade raises the success rate of shipment for
all merchants. A negative externality arises because trade expansion raises
the merchants' cost of hiring workers. The net eect of these externalities is
positive when enforcement is weak and negative when enforcement is strong.
The model identies strong and weak enforcement regimes parametrically.
Then the setup expands to a second market connected to the rst because
both draw labor and predators from a common pool. This gives rise to ex-
ternalities across markets, described here as international for access to the
familiar tools of international trade theory.
Section 2 analyzes the comparative statics of commercial policy. Trade
volume on the intensive margin responds to liberalization by more, the weaker
is enforcement. On the extensive margin, in contrast, liberalization is more
likely to initiate trade the stronger is enforcement. Thus the model can
explain episodes where liberalization increases trade by `too much' or `too
little' compared to standard policy model predictions.
Ecient commercial policy is analyzed in Section 3. The sign of ecient
policy depends crucially on the strength of enforcement. A merchant inter-
est government in an isolated market that internalizes the externalities of
competitive trade should subsidize trade when enforcement is weak and tax
trade when enforcement is strong. A trading monopoly will internalize the
externalities; no role for policy arises.6
International externalities create a role for commercial policy regardless
of market structure locally. Nash playing merchant interest governments
typically should subsidize trade. When enforcement is strong, subsidization
arises because prot-shifting is served by raising rivals' costs through the
labor market by subsidizing the national trading rm's expansion. When
enforcement is weak and trade volumes are strategic complements, prot
shifting is served by a subsidy because the subsidy induces foreign expansion
6One important reason for the formation of trading guilds was enforcement, but it is
possible and historically accurate to think of competition in trade volume while cooperat-
ing for enforcement purposes.
3that improves security. In contrast, when enforcement is weak but trade
volumes are strategic substitutes, Nash policies tax trade. The reason is
that the tax induces a foreign expansion that improves security by enough to
raise the sum of revenue and home prots. The model identies the strategic
interaction regimes parametrically.
Cooperative trade policies should always subsidize trade when enforce-
ment is weak and always tax trade when enforcement is strong. The intu-
ition is essentially the same as the competitive single market case | the two
trading rms fail to internalize the externalities they generate properly. In
contrast, when enforcement is weak in one region and strong in the other,
the cooperative policy taxes trade in the weak enforcement region and sub-
sidizes trade in the strong enforcement region, concentrating activity where
enforcement is strong. This result suggests a tradeo between eciency and
equity in regional development policies.
Section 4 considers trade policy toward parallel legal and illegal markets.
Smugglers evade taxes but draw o predators from legal trade. The analy-
sis shows that ocial tolerance of illegal markets alongside legal markets is
benecial when enforcement is weak and detrimental when enforcement is
strong. An example of each is provided by early American history. Prior to
1763, in the age of Caribbean piracy, British policy was legendarily tolerant
of smuggling. After 1763 the British Navy eradicated Caribbean piracy and
British policy switched to intolerance of piracy. The model thus provides an
economic rationale for the dramatic and consequential shift in British policy.
The basic logic of commercial policy in Sections 2-4 is derived for simplic-
ity in a partial equilibrium setting in which traders arbitrage between xed
buyer and seller prices. The Appendix shows that the qualitative logic holds
up in a general equilibrium model trade model. Monopoly power in this
setting expands to internalize the eect of volume expansion on the buyers'
willingness to pay.
Section 5 concludes with a discussion of desirable extensions.
The model is related to a literature on institutions and insecurity (for ex-
ample, Dixit, 2004, and references therein) and a smaller literature on trade
and insecurity (for example, Skaperdas and Syropoulos, 2001, 2002). The
novelty of the present line of research is that, very plausibly, predation oc-
curs on the trade activity itself. Anderson and Marcouiller (2005) investigate
the existence of insecure trading equilibrium in a two country two good Ri-
cardian general equilibrium trade model with xed trade costs. Much of the
commercial policy analysis of the paper ts into the strategic trade policy
4literature pioneered by Brander and Spencer (1985). It diers from that lit-
erature in that the sources of market interdependence are due to insecurity
and internationally linked labor markets.
1 Merchants, Traders and Predators
Trade is carried on by trading rms who obtain goods from a low cost origin
at xed price c and sell them in a high value destination at xed price b,
b > c. Trade costs are modeled with a neoclassical cost function, the result
of cost minimizing choices of capital and labor subject to a Cobb-Douglas
technology. Trade capital is in xed supply for the trade services market.
The cost function represents an industry of trading rms, each controlled by
a merchant supplying capital and his own labor to the trade activity and
hiring additional traders who are paid a market wage w:7
The traders come from a labor pool of xed size in which their alternative
activity is preying on the trade. In equilibrium the predators must earn an
expected return equal to their trade services wage w:
The traders and the predators interact in anonymous hide and seek. The
objective probability of an encounter is assumed to be a logistic function of
the ratio of predators to prey. Predators win all encounters if not prevented
by the enforcement technology. Enforcement eort frustrates a portion of
the encounters between predators and prey.
The `win' by the predators can be theft of all the shipment, but more
generally the win is a bargained share of the goods, encompassing extortion.
Extortion is a more plausible interpretation in many circumstances, such as
extortion by customs ocials or the soldiers stopping the Cameroonian beer
truck in the Economist story.
The basic elements of the model are the traders and predators and their
technologies for these two alternative activities. Their general equilibrium
interaction combines equality of returns in the two activities, the rational
expectations equilibrium shipment success rate, the labor market clearing
condition and the zero arbitrage (or prot maximizing) condition in trading.
For simplicity, but inessentially, other channels of general equilibrium are
shut down except in the Appendix. Traders and predators are not directly
7For simplicity, heterogeneity of merchants is assumed away, so they will all earn the
same return on their capital. Or, if they dier in ability, there is a rental market to ensure
that capital goes to its most productive use.
5involved either in production or consumption; their sole interest is the highest
expected return on their time.
The merchants may be organized in a guild that colludes to control trade
volume or they may freely compete. The competitive case is a useful bench-
mark because it reveals an externality that monopoly guilds can internalize,




Trade costs are given by the Cobb-Douglas cost function wr1 q where
q is the trade volume, w is the wage rate, r is the service price of trade capital
and  is the parametric cost share for labor.8 The trade services unit cost;
equal to the marginal cost of a price-taking competitive trading rm; is given
by:9
t(q;w) = kwq
(1= 1); k > 0: (1)
The demand for labor in trade services is equal to10
q
1=k:
The buyers' willingness to pay is xed at b while any quantity of the good
can be purchased by traders at xed price c;0 < c < b. The gross arbitrage
margin b c gives an incentive for merchants to enter trade by buying goods
at c, incurring trade costs t and hoping to sell at b  c + t.
Predators
Temporarily think of predation as robbery. The extension to extortion
will be made subsequently. Predation is the alternative use of labor. Like
traders, predators are risk neutral.11 A simple model of interaction between
8A number of the results hold for more general cost functions as will be noted below
where applicable.
9The short run cost function with xed capital K is given by kwq1=; where k =
[(1 )=K](1 )= > 0: This is formed by using (1 )wr q = K to solve for r(w;K;q);
then substituting to obtain C(w;K;q) = kwq1=:
10Here we use Shephard's Lemma.
11Risk aversion in the absence of insurance markets would tend to diminish predation
relative to trading under the plausible hypothesis that informal insurance and self insur-
ance are easier for traders.
6traders and predators yields clear implications that should hold up more
generally. Predators attempt to steal (eventually extort) goods while these
are in transit between the two regions. Once the trader and buyer meet
exchange is secure.12 Predators sell their loot in a thieves market at a price
normalized to one.13
Traders and predators are specialized: traders never attack each other
because such conict is too expensive in the even match that results, and
predators similarly do not attack each other even when one predator has
goods to steal. Thus the only matches with economic signicance are between
traders and predators, and predators always win. There is at most one
match per period. Traders cannot coordinate on a common defense strategy,
though each trader can individually take defensive actions to avoid meeting
the predators while in transit. Predators similarly do not coordinate oensive
strategies.
The objective probability of successful shipment by traders is built as a
compound of two elements, the avoidance probability and the enforcement
probability. The probability that the prey avoids the predator is a decreasing
function F of the ratio of predators to prey, B=q, where the volume of trade is
q and the number of predators is B (for bandits or bad guys). The objective
avoidance probability is given by the logistic function F(B=q) = 1=[1 +
B=q] where  is a parameter capturing the eectiveness of the predators'
technology for seeking and chasing relative to the traders' ability to hide and
run. The other element of shipment success is the enforcement probability
M: Of those shipments which fail to avoid the predators, a fraction M will
succeed anyway. Thus the objective success rate is given by F +(1 F)M =
M + (1   M)F:
Predation is now readily interpreted as extortion. The M parameter can
represent a bargained share left to the trader following an encounter. Behind
12If both goods and money are subject to predation or if goods can be stolen or ex-
torted from buyers after purchase, the setups are more cumbersome, but nothing essential
changes. Moreover, it is quite plausible that goods in transit are less secure than goods
at rest; our model focuses on a convenient limit case. Our simplifying assumption can be
rationalized by enforcement at points of sale, by reputation of buyer and seller, or by the
ability of massed concentrations of buyers and sellers to coordinate to deter opportunism
which is against their collective interest.
13That traders and predators sell the goods at dierent prices reects the intuition
that consumers' willingness to pay for stolen or shady goods is dierent. All results are
qualitatively unchanged if we assume that both traders and predators sell at the same
price b:
7the bargaining outcome lie outside options which might reect spoliation of
the goods in the event of a struggle, or the eects of an alarm to the enforcers.
Toward Equilibrium
Agents form beliefs  about the success rate of traders, and in equilibrium
the beliefs converge on M +(1 M)F: The full equilibrium is solved for the
values of B and q; the wage rate w and the equilibrium success rate :
It is useful to rst characterize the rational expectations success rate con-
ditional on trade volume. Potential predators allocate themselves between
predation and trading to equalize payos given the wage rate and their be-
liefs about success rates in predation. In equilibrium the beliefs converge to
objective success rates (which depend on B). Labor market equilibrium links
the wage to a given volume of trade, hence links the equilibrium success rate
to a given volume of trade. The full equilibrium is solved from the zero prot
condition in trading, embedding equilibrium wages and success rates.
1.2 The Equilibrium Success Rate
The agents' beliefs about  determine the expected payos to trading and
predation and hence the choice between the two activities. In rational ex-
pectations equilibrium, the subjective probability must equal the objective
probability, the returns to labor on both types of activity must be equal and
the labor market must clear.
The expected return to predation per predator is (1 )q=B; 14 while em-
ployment in trade services pays w: Agents are indierent between predation











Substituting the labor allocation condition (2) into the objective probability
function yields the success rate conditional on the wage: For the logistic
function this simplies to:15
(w) = M + w=: (3)
14Predators sell their loot securely in a thieves market at constant price normalized to
one, without loss of generality.
15In general, the xed point problem has a trivial solution at  = 1; since F(0) = 1:
Graphing F[(1 )=w] against  shows that if  = 1 is the only solution, it is stable under
the plausible hypothesis that the subjective probability  adjusts toward the objective
probability given the beliefs F[(1   )=w]: If an interior solution exists and is unique, it
must be stable because  F0=w < 1 in the neighborhood of the solution. In this case the
8The labor market clears when the total supply of labor N is equal to the
sum of labor demanded in trade services and predation. Using (2), (4) and
the demand for labor in the trade industry q1=k yields:
N = kq
1= + q[1   (w)]=w (4)




N   kq1= + q=
: (5)
Note that Wq > 0; the equilibrium wage is an increasing function of trade
volume: Moreover, the wage function is inelastic at low (w;q) and elastic at
high (w;q) with a unique critical value of q for which it is unit elastic. See
Figures 1-3 for an illustration of the behavior of W=(1   M)  
(q).
Substituting (5) into (3) yields the equilibrium success rate as a function
of the volume of trade q and of the exogenous parameters (M;N;k;;):
(q) = [W(q)] = M +
1   M
(N=q   kq1= 1) + 1
: (6)
Notice that the success rate is increasing in the volume of trade, an eect
called `safety in numbers' by Anderson and Bandiera (2006). Safety in num-
bers arises because of increasing opportunity cost of predators. At constant
opportunity cost w; (2) implies that the equilibrium B=q is constant, driven
by free entry of predators.
1.3 The Full Equilibrium
The equilibrium volume of competitive trade is determined by the no ar-
bitrage condition of prot-maximizing traders in a free entry equilibrium.
Traders expect to break even when b   c   t = 0: Their beliefs about 
must be consistent with the equilibrium probability of success. The wage
rate which helps determine the trade cost t and the success rate  must be
secure equilibrium is unstable. There could be multiple interior equilibria, depending on
the shape of the cumulative density function F: With multiple equilibria, unstable interior
solutions are anked by stable interior solutions.
16The right hand side of (4) is decreasing in w and is unboundedly large at very low w;
so a unique stable solution exists.
9consistent with labor market equilibrium for the volume of trade. The full
equilibrium of the model is determined by goods and labor market clear-
ance simultaneously, embedding the equilibrium probability of success as a
function of the wage.
The competitive equilibrium quantity for a given wage uniquely satises






b   c   wkq
( 1
 1) = 0: (7)
(7) together with (4) determines the equilibrium wage and quantity.
It is convenient to analyze equilibrium by replacing the wage with the
normalized wage !  w=(1   M). Then  = !(1 M)= +M and thus !=
gives the avoidance success rate of shippers. The equilibrium pair (!;q) is
determined as follows. Divide both sides of equation (5) by 1   M to form:
W(q;M)=(1   M)  
(q) =
q
N   kq1= + q=
(8)
Replace w in (7) with !(1   M). The labor market equilibrium condition
and the zero arbitrage condition can now be plotted in q;! space. Figure
1 illustrates. Equilibrium with insecure trade is found where !  , or
equivalently w  (1 M). The graphs of (8) and ( 7) are drawn as functions
of ! in the region !   for the case where Mb   c < 0:17
For some parameter ranges, Q(!(1   M);M) will lie everywhere below

 and autarky is the only equilibrium. For other parameter ranges, secure
trade is the only equilibrium. See Anderson and Bandiera (2006) for more
discussion. This paper concentrates on the case of insecure equilibrium at
point E in Figure 1.
The alternative form of the choice of trade volume is monopoly. This
form becomes natural in the context of the merchant guilds required to solve
the collective action problem of law enforcement. The earnings of capital in




(b   c   t)dq =

(M + w=)b   c   wkq
1= 1
q: (9)
Competitive trading implies Sq = 0 while monopoly trading implies
Sq + SwWq = 0 (10)
= [b   c   t] + [(   M)b   t]Wqq=W (11)
17If the condition is violated, some trade will always occur even if an encounter with a
predator is certain. Thus this plausible condition opens the door to predation destroying
all trade.
10under the plausible assumption that the monopoly understands the depen-
dence of both trade costs and the shipment success rate on the underlying
labor market equilibrium.18 Monopoly equilibrium lies in one of two regions.
The strong enforcement case
M > [(1   )b + c]=b
implies that Sq > 0;Sw < 0 while the weak enforcement case
M < [(1   )b + c]=b
implies that Sq < 0;Sw > 0: It is helpful for analyzing strategic interaction
below to restate the enforcement regime condition as
Mb   c < (>)(1   )(b   c);
with the interpretation that the eectively secure gross margin falls short of
or exceeds capital's share of the gross margin. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate,
again using the normalized wage !. Further analysis is in the Appendix.
As with competitive trade, autarky or secure trade may be the only stable
equilibria, depending on parameters. Autarky cannot be a stable equilibrium
with strong enforcement.
The guild uses its knowledge of the externalities generated in the labor
market in choosing the optimal trade volume. There is a negative pecuniary
externality due to the cost push from more trade to higher demand for labor
to higher trade costs t: Opposing this is a positive non-pecuniary externality,
safety in numbers, due to the rise in wages pulling predators into trade and
increasing security. The weak enforcement case means in equilibrium that
Sq = b   c   t < 0; associated with Sw > 0; where the safety in numbers
externality dominates the cost push externality. The strong enforcement case
implies, in contrast, that cost push dominates safety in numbers.
1.4 The Two Country Model
Two markets are connected through their trading activities. Formally, there
is dene a second market parallel to the rst, with foreign variables denoted
18The sophistication of the monopolist is not crucial to the qualitative results. In an early
version of this model (Anderson and Bandiera, 2003) we modeled a naive monopolist who
took the wage as given, understood that trade cost depended on q given w; and understood
through the objective probability F that increases in q would raise  for given predation
B: The qualitative results were the same as in the present case.
11by *. A common labor pool supplies all predators and all labor in trade
services. As in the one country model, a rise in the wage both raises trade
costs and improves security, but the eect now has an inter-market or in-
ternational externality. A useful alternative interpretation of the model sees
the * market as a smuggling activity. Legal market commercial policy has
eects on the smuggling activity that aect the optimal policy.






+ q[1   (w)]=w + q
[1   
(w)]=w: (12)
This implies a market clearing wage
w = W(q;q
) =
q(1   M) + q(1   M)
N   kq1=   k(q)1= + q= + q=: (13)
The graphical analysis of full equilibrium with one country's trade based
on Figures 1-3 readily generalizes to the two country model. The parallels to
Figures 1-3 depict, for example, the foreign market volume conditional on a
given home market volume. The cross eects between markets run through
the equilibrium wage function. A rise in home market volume raises the wage
associated with any given foreign volume q.
2 Comparative Statics of Commercial Policy
Commercial policy is modeled here as a change in c. This is natural when
the policy instrument is the price of access to infrastructure such as port
facilities. Subsidized access is indeed very common. A trade tax also can
be thought of as acting on c when predation is understood as extortion.19 If
predation is extortion by customs ocials, then auditing may well compel
corrupt ocials to correctly collect taxes while extracting added bribes from
shippers in order to let the goods through in a timely manner.
First consider the response of trade in a single market to a change in
c, the policy-inclusive cost of the goods to traders. When trade is initially
positive, the eect on marginal surplus is given by Sqc =  1: The result, not
19The metaphor of theft, in contrast, suggests that liberalization should be modeled as
a rise in b; with taris only being paid on the goods which escape predation. The technical
analysis of this case is a bit more complex because b enters multiplicatively with . This
dierence is inessential for the qualitative results.
12surprisingly, is a rise in trade volume q as c falls for given M; as illustrated
in Figure 1 by the equilibrium point E moving northeast along 
(q): With
monopoly too, equilibrium trade volume rises with a fall in c; illustrated in
Figures 2 and 3.
An important implication of the model is that trade is ordinarily more
responsive to liberalization on the intensive margin the lower is enforcement
capability. Specically dq=dc is smaller in absolute value the higher is M, all
else held equal. The discussion is in the Appendix. Intuitively, the impor-
tance of the safety in numbers externality declines as enforcement capability
rises.
In contrast, consider the eect of liberalization on the extensive margin.20
Potential predation can prohibit trade initially (see Anderson and Bandiera,
2006, for details). In Figure 1, autarky is the only stable competitive equi-
librium for initial parameter values such that the 
(q) function lies outside
the Q(!;M) function. In this case, a fall in c moves the market closer to
a jump from autarky to an interior solution such as E on the diagram. All
else equal, the larger is M, the more likely it is that a given reduction in c
will cause the inception of trade, provided that M < 1=2.21 Thus extensive
margin competitive responses are larger the higher is enforcement quality, for
M < 1=2. In contrast, for M > 1=2, decreases in c are less likely to increase
trade on the extensive margin the larger is M.
Reductions in c can similarly initiate monopoly trade starting from a weak
enforcement regime. The inception of trade necessarily occurs if the fall in c
is large enough to ip the enforcement regime from weak to strong. That is
because interior monopoly equilibrium always exists with strong enforcement
(see Anderson and Bandiera, 2006 for more discussion). The regime ip is
more likely for a given sized fall in c the larger is M, hence this type of
extensive margin rise in monopoly trade is, like competitive trade, more
likely the larger is M. For a fall in c that does not ip the enforcement
regime, the analysis is essentially the same as the competitive case: the
inception of trade is more likely the larger is M provided that M < 1=2. For
[b+(1 c]=b > M > 1=2, decreases in c are less likely to increase extensive
margin trade the larger is M.
20Recent theoretical and empirical work emphasizes that extensive margin changes are
a very important component of overall trade volume responses to liberalization and other
exogenous shocks.
21The critical value of ! for which Sq(0;!) = 0 is given by (c=b   M)=(1   M). The
critical value is decreasing in M for M < 1=2.
13Trade liberalization in one market also spills over to change the volume
in un-liberalized markets. Using signs for the spillovers derived in Sections 3
and 4, liberalization reduces (increases) trade on the intensive margin in un-
liberalized monopoly markets when enforcement is strong (weak). It increases
trade in unliberalized competitive markets when c   Mb > 0. Spillovers act-
ing on the extensive margin can initiate trade in competitive markets (the 

function shifts to the right in Figure 1), and in monopoly markets with weak
enforcement.
These and other comparative static eects of endogenous trade cost pa-
rameters on dq=dc implied by the model provide a framework to analyze the
highly disparate responses of trade to liberalization episodes across countries.
The model implies that dq=dc is smaller the smaller is k, which embodies the
merchant capital, infrastructure or technology. The elasticity of import de-
mand, the usual parameter that determines the response to liberalization,
can be incorporated into the comparative statics of liberalization based on
the general equilibrium extension of the model laid out in Section 5.
3 Ecient Commercial Policy
Suppose that the government sets policy to maximize the prots of mer-
chants. This assumption is natural in the model since merchants are the
only location specic agents.
Mercantilist policy often granted trade monopolies. Interpreted in light
of the model, this policy overcame the free rider problem of private enforce-
ment provision while also maximizing prots by bestowing on merchants
the monopoly power over trade volume. It may have been ecient. Alter-
natively, government or a merchant guild provides private enforcement but
leaves volume to be competitively determined. What is the ecient trade
policy?
Trade expansion has two eects on trade costs: the pecuniary cost push
externality drives up the transport cost t while the non-pecuniary safety
in numbers externality raises the success rate on trade : The net eect
of the externalities is negative (cost push dominates) in strong enforcement
equilibrium and the net eect is positive (safety in numbers dominates) in
weak enforcement equilibrium.
Competitive merchants fail to internalize the externality, but their mer-
chant interest government can do so, subsidizing trade in weak enforcement
14equilibrium and taxing trade in strong enforcement equilibrium. A trading
monopoly will in contrast internalize both externalities. In a multi-market
setting, the trading monopoly fails to fully internalize, however, opening a
role for government. When the markets are separated by borders, rival gov-
ernments play Nash policies, or they may cooperate.
3.1 Ecient Policy in a Single Market
The net payo for a government that acts in merchants' interest but also
cares about revenue is given by
G(c) = S[q(c);W[q(c)];c] + q(c   c
0):
  1 is the Marginal Cost of Funds (MCF) that must be raised from alter-
native revenue sources. For simplicity  is assumed to be constant. q(c c0)
is the revenue raised by a tax c   c0 when this is positive or the subsidy
required when c   c0 is negative.
The government inuences the choice of q by altering c with a tax or
subsidy. Competitive traders determine a trade volume such that Sq = 0
while a merchant guild sets aggregate volume such that Sq + SwWq = 0:
For the monopoly trade case, using the monopolist's rst order condition,
the government objective function rises with c according to
Gc = (   1)q + (c   c












If lump sum taxation is available,  = 1 and Gc < 0 except at c = c0; free
trade, where MCF c = 1. Otherwise, Gc = 0 provides a revenue motive to
require c > c0; at least a small amount of trade taxation to substitute for
more expensive alternative revenue sources.22
In contrast, competitively determined trade implies an untreated exter-
nality at the free trade point.
Gc = (   1)q + (c   c
0)dq=dc + SwWqdq=dc:
22The second order condition for this and succeeding problems is normally met, as may
be checked in this case: Gcc = (2   1)dq=dc + (c   c0)d2q=dc2; which is negative by
dq=dc < 0 unless the combination of large taxes and d2q=dc2 > 0 prevents it. In that case,
a lower tax rate will satisfy both the rst and second order conditions.
15Proposition 1 With no international externalities and no revenue motive
( = 1), the optimal policy of the merchant interest government is: (a) laissez
faire when the merchant guild has monopoly power in trade; (b) c   c0 =
 SwWq in the absence of monopoly power; subsidize trade when enforcement
is weak, Sw > 0, and tax trade when enforcement is strong, Sw < 0:
Proposition 1 provides a rationale for the Mercantilist predilection for
trading monopolies in an era when predation was very strong. Revenue mo-
tives combine with the domestic externality correction when  > 1: This
observation and Proposition 1 imply that when revenue is expensive and
enforcement is weak, monopoly secures ecient trade while avoiding the
subsidy needed for ecient competitive trade. State monopoly grants would
have been more eective than merchant guilds that would have been vulner-
able to defection and entry, with consequent loss of full internalization of the
externality.23
3.2 International Externalities
In the two country model, a trade monopoly is assumed to operate exclu-
sively in each market. International externalities travel through the common
labor market. These international externalities operate independently of the
standard terms-of-trade externalities that are shut down by assumption.
The two trade monopoly rivals lack the commitment power by which to
exploit the eect of their decisions on their rival's choice of trade. Their
governments can supply the lack with prot-shifting trade policies.
The Nash equilibrium trade policies will in most parameter ranges sub-
sidize trade. This occurs for two separate reasons. When enforcement is
mutually strong, prot shifting is served by raising rivals' costs through the
labor market, achieved by subsidizing own trade. When enforcement is mu-
tually weak and trade volumes are strategic complements, prots are raised
by a subsidy that enduces foreign expansion because this improves the secu-
rity of own trade. In contrast, when enforcement is mutually weak but trade
volumes are strategic substitutes, a tax on trade improves security by raising
the rival's trade volume, and this serves to increase the sum of prots and
revenue.
The Nash policies are inecient. Cooperative policies achieve eciency
23The model abstracts from standard dead weight loss due to the monopolist's ability
to benet from the dependence of b and/or c on volume.
16by internalizing the international externality of policy. Cooperative policy
subsidizes trade in mutual weak enforcement equilibrium and taxes trade in
mutual strong enforcement equilibrium. When enforcement regimes dier,
ecient cooperative policy subsidizes the strong and taxes the weak. Note
again that the model's subsidy implications are not unrealistic since subsidy
to trade realistically comes via infrastructure provision that lowers c without
full taxation to cover the provision.
Trade is determined by foreign and domestic guilds in a Nash equilibrium
dened by






This system of equations yields the Nash equilibrium volumes q(c;c);q(c;c):
For simplicity in modeling government objectives, assume  = 1 = ;
so there is no revenue motive, and assume that trade is monopolistically de-
termined so there is no domestic externality correction motive. The objective
functions of the two governments are given by G = Sfq(c;c);W[q(c;c);q(c;c)];cg+
q(c   c0) and G = Sfq(c;c);W[q(c;c);q(c;c)];cg + q(c   c0).
3.2.1 Nash Trade Policies
Each government sets trade policy to maximize its objective function given
the policy of the other government. The Nash equilibrium in noncooperative
trade policies is determined by:













While the monopoly is able to internalize the eect of its own volume de-
cision on the labor market, it is by assumption unable to do so for foreign
volume. This leaves a role for government to respond at the margin to the
international externality.






q is the slope of the foreign best response function, the values of q
which satisfy S
q + S
wWq = 0 for any given value of q: A similar optimal
17tax characterizes the foreign government's policy. Since Wq > 0; the sign of
the tax is the sign of  SwR
q. Formally,
Lemma 1 In Nash equilibrium, trade is taxed (subsidized) when Sw and
R
q dier in (have the same) sign.
The slope of the best response functions is determined by dierentiating
the rst order conditions of the trade guilds. Assuming the second order
condition is met, the Appendix shows that the sign of R












 = Wqq=W and 

q = @
=@q. The Appendix shows that 

q > 0.
Recall that enforcement is strong, S
w < 0, (weak, S
w > 0) as Mb  c > (<
)(1   )(b   c). Entirely analogous conditions sign Rq.
Lemma 2(a) Trade volumes are strategic substitutes if enforcement is
strong, (b) trade volumes are strategic complements if enforcement is weak
and Mb   c < 0, (c) trade volumes may be strategic substitutes if 0 <
Mb   c < (1   )(b   c).
The possibilities for non-cooperative trade policy equilibria are presented
in Table 1. The equilibria represented by the rst two rows and columns
distinguish between two types of weak enforcement equilibria, those with
strategic complementarity and those with strategic substitutability. The rst
two rows and columns represent equilibria with weak enforcement, which
may not exist for all parameter values. The middle column represents the
possible case where R
q < 0 despite S
w > 0. A necessary condition for the
middle column case is (1   )(b   c) > Mb   c > 0.
One case of subsidy has a familiar cause, though in a new setting. When
Sw < 0 and S
w < 0;, strong enforcement equilibrium, trade volumes are
strategic substitutes, R
q < 0 and Rq < 0: The rationale for subsidy is
essentially the Brander-Spencer prot-shifting mechanism: subsidizing the
home trader monopoly under strategic substitutability permits it to take
more of the world's trade and hence prots from trade.
In contrast, weak enforcement equilibrium induces optimal subsidies through
a dierent mechanism. In this case there is strategic complementarity. Due
to `demand complementarity',24 the home trader benets from the foreign
trader's expansion. Due to strategic complementarity, the home government
24Demand complementarity is used here to describe a positive response of the markets'
willingness to pay for trade services, b   c   t, to a rise in q.
18Table 1: Nash Equilibrium Policies
Weak, R
q > 0 Weak, R
q < 0 Strong
Weak*, Rq > 0 subsidy, subsidy* subsidy, tax* tax, tax*
Weak*, Rq < 0 tax, subsidy* tax, tax* subsidy, tax*
Strong* tax, tax* tax, subsidy* subsidy, subsidy*
achieves internalization of this benet through subsidy. Weak enforcement
can also induce optimal taxes when trade volumes are strategic substitutes.
In this case the security improving benet of foreign expansion is obtained
by taxing own trade.
Taxation also arises when Sw and S
w dier in sign. The intuitive ra-
tionale for this case as compared to the cases under (i) is similar to the
switch in the Brander-Spencer logic made by Eaton and Grossman: with
`demand substitutes' in the home market (Sw < 0) but strategic complemen-
tarity (S
w > 0), taxation is the optimal rent-shifting policy. Taxation also
arises in this model with 'demand complements' in the home market but
strategic substitutability for the foreign response, a more novel possibility
relative to the Brander-Spencer model literature. Brander (1995) surveys
all the possibilities in an abstract setup that explores the four possible com-
binations of strategic substitutability/complementarity and demand substi-
tutes/complements, an abstraction clothed here with the details of a model
in which each possibility can easily be realized with appropriate combinations
of the strength of enforcement in the two markets.
3.2.2 Cooperative Trade Policies
Now consider international cooperation in trade policy. The response of joint







Here the new cross eects G
c; Gc incorporate the eect of domestic policy
on the other government's objective function. The implications for jointly
desirable policy change are seen by evaluating the cross eect at the Nash
equilibrium values of policy. Considering the home policy for example, at
the Nash equilibrium policies, Gc + G
c = S
wWqdq=dc: This has the sign of
 S
w:































Proposition 2 (a) When policies are set cooperatively, trade should be
subsidized (taxed) in mutual weak (strong) enforcement equilibrium. (b) With
enforcement asymmetry, the weak market should be taxed and the strong mar-
ket should be subsidized.
The optimal interventions internalize the international externality of do-
mestic trade policy. Proposition 2 (b) deals with the case where one coun-
try or region has weak enforcement and the other has strong enforcement.
Strongly asymmetric regional policies are ecient | the weak are weakened
and the strong are strengthened.
The need for intervention arises with cooperative policies because in con-
trast to the one country case, the two national guilds do not internalize
the eect of their actions on each other. This discussion and the preceding
discussion of the sign of optimal Nash policy suggests that the case for in-
ternational coordination of trade policy is even stronger than the standard
tari case because the sign of the trade policy can switch in moving from non-
cooperative to cooperative equilibrium. The dierence between the present
analysis and the standard analysis of Nash vs. cooperative taris is wide.
The present analysis centers on an international externality which operates
through endogenous trade costs rather than endogenous terms of trade.
The preceding analysis applies to regional policy as well as international
commercial policy. This application is more natural because coordination is
far more natural when thinking of a national government constraining the
actions of state governments and because the model is based on interaction
through a common labor market. For example, in U.S. history before the
Civil War, New York and Pennsylvania both competitively subsidized canal
and rail building to the interior of the country while after the Civil War the
rail subsidies were determined nationally. Asymmetric enforcement regimes
20cause a poignant conict between eciency and equity for national govern-
ment policy toward regions. Eciency indicates strengthening the strong and
weakening the weak, but equity suggests acting in the opposite direction.
4 Commercial Policy with Smuggling
What does commercial policy look like in a predatory world that includes
an illegal market such as a smuggled version of legal goods or another illegal
good? The two market setup can be reinterpreted to reect this common
situation of parallel legal and illegal markets. The * variables now refer to
those of the illegal market. Policy includes taxes or subsidies in the legal
market and tolerance or intolerance of the illegal activity.
Collective action being more dicult in illegal activity, trade volume in
the illegal market is likely to be set competitively and `enforcement' in the
illegal market is exogenous with 0  M < M. M can be greater than zero,
reecting extortion by predators from smugglers. (An alternative setup is
explored in Anderson and Bandiera, 2006, in which a maa provides enforce-
ment in the illegal market and its monopoly pricing is a key element in the
analysis of anti-drugs policies.)
The `best response' function of the smugglers reects competitive reac-
tions, N
q = S
q[q;W(q;q)] = 0. R
q =  N
qq=N
qq is signed by S
qww =
[(   M)b   t] = c   Mb > 0 ordinarily.25 Thus illegal trade is ordi-
narily a strategic complement of legal trade.
Now consider the eect of smuggling on the response of legal trade to
trade liberalization. The Nash equilibrium trade volumes are determined by
Nq = Sq + SwWq = 0 and N
q = S
q[q;W(q;q)] = 0. Dierentiating the
system with respect to c and solving yields dq=dc = 1=[Nqq + NqqR
q]. Thus
Proposition 3 smuggling lowers (raises) jdq=dcj as Nqq < (>)0; i.e., as
enforcement is strong (weak).
Turning to the implication for optimal trade policy, the rst order condi-
tion for the government yields:
Gc = [(c   c0) + SwWqR

q]dq=dc = 0:
The rst order condition implies that:
25This is a plausible condition. If it is violated, even when a trader is certain to encounter
a predator, at least some trade will always occur. The condition implies weak enforcement.
21Proposition 4 Absent revenue motives, trade in the presence of smug-
gling should be taxed in strong enforcement equilibrium and subsidized in weak
enforcement equilibrium.
Proposition 4 suggests that high tax/high smuggling equilibria are not
ecient. Thus revenue needs that require trade taxes in weak enforcement
environments lay a heavy burden on the economy.
Anti- or pro-smuggling policy is another important policy instrument.
Suppose the state can change c by some costless action, such as permitting
or denying smugglers access to port facilities. A fall in q raises or lowers
legal merchants' prots as enforcement is strong or weak. Formalizing this
insight,
Gc = [(c   c0)Rq + SwWq]dq
=dc
 = 0:
When c = c0, the optimal policy on c drives Sw = 0, assuming this is fea-
sible with interior equilibrium. For c   c06= 0, the optimal c policy solves
Sw =  (c c0)Rq=Wq. At the optimal c policy, changes in c are ordinarily
eective in raising surplus further since the standard stability condition im-
plies that R
q > Rq. For weak enforcement, c < c0 and an interior optimum
c;c policy is possible where smuggling is subsidized optimally. For strong
enforcement, c > c0 and the optimal policy is to attack smuggling to the
extent possible; no interior optimum is possible. The implication is that c
policy is more powerful than c policy. The global analysis makes this point
clear, as given in Figure 4 for the case where enforcement is weak and Figure
5 for the case of strong enforcement.
The government's policy in the merchants' interests in eect confers on
the trade monopoly a rst mover advantage that it lacks in setting its trade
strategy. When the government is able to aect the smugglers' cost directly,
it can shift the smugglers' best response function along the legal market
monopoly's best response function. Assume for the moment that such shifts
are feasible while the interior insecure equilibrium still obtains. Then the
optimal policy shifts the smugglers' reaction function to the optimal point
where a legal market iso-prot contour is tangent to the legal market best
response function, point L on Figure 4. This yields higher prots than those
associated with the optimal c given by point L on Figure 4. The analogous
analysis for the case of strong enforcement is given in Figure 5.
Summarizing the implications:
Proposition 5 (a) The optimal smuggling policy of a revenue motivated
government encourages it when enforcement is weak and suppresses it when
22enforcement is strong.
The analysis illuminates a crucial regime change in British policy toward
its American colonies around 1763, the end of the Seven Years War (called
the French and Indian War in its North American aspect). Ocial toleration
of smuggling prevailed for a century prior to 1763 as smugglers almost openly
used the major American ports. Afterwards, British intolerance of smuggling
fueled resentment leading to the American Revolution.
Applying the model, weak enforcement prevailed prior to 1763 as British
naval forces contended with their European rivals, especially the French in
the 18th century. In terms of the model, Sw > 0, hence rational tolerance was
the optimal British policy. After 1763, the released British naval forces sup-
pressed piracy in its Caribbean bases. By implication the equilibrium shifted
to a strong enforcement regime where Sw < 0 and intolerance of smuggling
became rational for a government in the legal merchants' interest.26
In contrast, the usual economic explanation for the regime change of 1763
is the increased demand for revenue by the British government following
its expensive war with the French.27 In terms of the model, however, an
increased appetite for revenue cannot cause a rational regime change from
tolerance to intolerance of smuggling. Formally, a rise in ; the marginal cost
of funds from alternative sources, normally leads to a rise in the tax on legal
trade c: The eect of the rise in  and c on smuggling policy is implied by
Gc = [(c   c0)Rq + SwWq]dq
=dc
:
When enforcement is weak, the incentive to subsidize smuggling is increased,
G
c falls, while when enforcement is strong the incentive to attack smuggling
is increased, G
c rises.
26The model oers a novel economic interest explanation of the bitter divisions within
the colonies during the Revolution: the switch to intolerance benetted legal merchants
while harming the merchant capital tied up in the illegal market, along with harming
the common sailors. Loyalists have been estimated to comprise as much as 1/3 of the
population during the Revolution. In contrast, prior to 1763 the British policy of 'benign
and salutary neglect' aided all three groups.
27The increased revenue demand story is somewhat problematic because the revenue
motive operated during and prior to the war years too, when Americans under threat from
the French and their native allies had a strong incentive to cooperate with the British
in raising revenue for their defense, as indeed they did with funding colonial militias.
Another problem with the revenue demand story is the relatively small revenues involved
in actual British tax plans. The economic motive of this paper complements a plausible
non-economic story oered by historians. After 1763 there was a shift to centralized and
rational bureaucratic administration throughout the British Empire.
23A limitation of the model is that the exogeneity of b shuts down a possible
motive for anti-smuggling policy which could raise the willingness to pay for
legal goods. However, this motive would also have operated before 1763, so
it cannot explain the regime shift.
5 Conclusion
This paper provides a formal model of trade policy in a predatory world.
Ecient trade policy in this world may often require subsidy to trade, real-
istically provided through subsidy to transport infrastructure. International
externalities due to both cost push and non-pecuniary spillovers on the secu-
rity of trade indicate the desirability of cooperation in setting trade policies.
The model provides insights into why illegal markets operating alongside
legal ones are sometimes tolerated and sometimes attacked.
A richer model of government would allow a deeper exploration of the in-
teraction of trade liberalization with policies designed to aect the other costs
of trade, especially those associated with enforcement costs. The merchant
interest model has at least opened the door. Optimal commercial policy in
this setup reveals key elements that will be at work in richer models.
A major challenge is to embed the government in political economy. One
use of such a model would view the predators as corrupt customs ocials
with the costly enforcement being lobbying by merchants to reduce extortion
by ocials. The current model assumes a xed cost of enforcement. It is
simple to endogenize enforcement eort by allowing for a variable component,
though it is not clear that it can stand as a good metaphor for lobbying costs
to persuade a top politician to crack down on his corrupt bureaucracy.28
Another political economy challenge is the state's objective function.
Usually the merchants' interest will be well represented in the state's ob-
jective function, but not fully, as here. States care about the interests of
their legitimate citizens and even their illegitimate ones. Pointing the way
forward, while in the current setup labor supplies both markets, the general
equilibrium setup of Section 5 gives labor a locational identity in consump-
tion.
The organization of the provision of enforcement is the another impor-
tant topic for deeper exploration. Private enforcement is provided here by a
trading monopoly or by a guild which permits competitive trading. It could
28I am in debt to Avinash Dixit for pointing this out.
24alternatively be provided by a monopoly enforcer such as a maa (see Ander-
son and Bandiera, 2006). Details of the economic environment are likely to
determine which organizational form can be successful, and therefore which
state policies may be able to reap the benets of private enforcement without
the costs of monopoly. Some types of enforcement activity are less purely
public than the setup of this paper. Such forms are less subject to under-
provision due to free riding, but may present negative externality problems
(car alarms deect predators onto unprotected cars). If the state takes over
the provision of enforcement, it must of course collect revenues to pay for it.
These may include revenue raised from the taxation of trade, leading to the
interaction of trade taxes with the insecurity of trade.
Another useful extension of the present setup is to explore the eect of
capital mobility on the merchants' interests, and hence the desirability of
integration in the form of international capital mobility.
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277 Appendix 1: Strategic Cross Eects
R
q is obtained from totally dierentiating the rst order condition of the
foreign trading duopolist S
q+S
wWq = 0 and solving for dq=dq. Analogous
procedures apply to deriving Rq.
It simplies the derivation to rewrite the rst order condition as
(
b







 = 0 (16)
where 
  Wqq=W and [(   M)b   t] = S
ww=q. The sign of R
q is
given by the sign of the derivative of the rst order condition with respect



















Utilizing [(   M)b   t] = S













  Wqq=W. Factoring out the positive common term Wq=W
yields











The right hand side of (17) simplies further using the properties of the





q + (1   )t
:
The rst order condition substituted on the right hand side above implies
S=q =  S
wWq + (1   )t. Then  (1   )t =  S=q   S
wWq. Substi-














Utilizing the properties of S, the rst two terms simplify, yielding










28Since  signs R
q, (18) allows a complete characterization of possible equi-
librium congurations. 

q > 0, which will be proved below. Enforcement is
weak or strong as Mb   c < (1   )(b   c) or Mb   c > (1   )(b   c)
(implying S
w > 0 or S
w < 0). Therefore R
q > 0 for Mb   c < 0 while
R
q < 0 for Mb   c > (1   )(b   c). For 0 < Mb   c < (1   )(b   c)
it is possible that despite S
w > 0, R
q < 0. Analogous procedures yield the
analogous conditions that sign Rq.
It remains to prove that 

qq=
 > 0. This follows from
W(q;q
) =
q(1   M) + q(1   M)
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8 Appendix 2: General Equilibrium
8.1 General Equilibrium
All qualitative implications about commercial policy continue to hold in a
simple general equilibrium model that embeds the partial equilibrium model
29of the text. The general equilibrium model resembles others in the trade
literature built with the same purpose in mind. Terms of trade eects are shut
down for simplicity because they present familiar elements for commercial
policy analysis.29
Each country produces a numeraire good and an export good consumed
only by foreigners. Numeraire production is given by an endowment in each
country. The export good of the home country has unit labor requirement
equal to a, so the cost of goods supplied by the home country to the foreign
country is given by c = aw. Similarly the cost of goods supplied by the
foreign country to the home country is given by c = aw. Unlike most trade
models, labor is internationally mobile, so the wage rate is internationally
equalized. Merchant capital, in contrast, is country-specic just as it was
in the preceding sections. This leads to diminishing returns in the trade
activity carried on by each set of merchants. The numeraire good is costlessly
tradable30 but the non-numeraire goods require trade services. The direction
of trade in the numeraire good is an inessential detail residually dependent
on the details of the general equilibrium model that determine the volume of
trade in the non-numeraire goods.
The predators prey on the non-numeraire good trade of each country,
earning an expected return equal to the wage they could earn in productive
activity, production of the export goods or in trade services. The stolen (or
extorted) goods in expected amounts q(1 ) and q(1 ) are resold in the
retail markets with the legitimate goods, but incur a xed iceberg trade cost
in doing so. Thus bq(1 ) worth of non-numeraire goods nets the predators
on home imports (b=T)q(1   ) where T  1. In the partial equilibrium
model, the trade costs were set equal to b so that the thieves' market price
was equal to one. Here in contrast the thieves' market is integrated with the
legitimate market as a simple way to close the general equilibrium model.
For simplicity, T = 1 = T .31
The predators come from the common labor pool and are all identical in
29Allowing for terms of trade eects can sometimes enable trade in a world that otherwise
would be autarkic. Anderson and Marcouiller (2005) provide a model where terms of trade
improvement raises the real wage of the poorer country, that supplies all the predators,
by enough to reduce the lure of predation suciently to enable trade. The result suggests
subsidizing trade to improve security, an argument that resembles those above.
30This simplication is inessential so long as trade costs are exogenous.
31It may be useful in future work to consider the use of T as a policy instrument by the
government, but for present purposes this is a distraction.
30their productivity in the various types of production and predation. They
have tastes that dier, however, depending on their origin, so some of them
spend their income in the home country, buying the home numeraire good
and the foreign export good while the remainder of the predators spend
their income in the foreign country buying the foreign numeraire good and
the home export good. This setup closes the general equilibrium model in
the simplest way that is consistent with the underlying deep cause of trade:
taste dierences.
Tastes are modeled with quasi-linear utility, linear in the numeraire good
and a strictly concave function f(z) = z;0 <  < 1 of the non-numeraire
good in the home country and f(z) = (z) in the foreign country. Under
these assumptions, denoting the price of the numeraire good as p, the home
buyer's willingness to pay for the non-numeraire good b is given by b =
pz 1. The foreign buyer's willingness to pay for the non-numeraire good
(exported from the home country) is given by z = p(q) 1. It is useful
for future purposes below to note that expenditure on the non-numeraire
good in terms of the numeraire is given by bz=p = f(z) and similarly for
the foreign country. The individual demand z is scaled up by the number
of agents with home tastes, N, to form the aggregate home demand for the
non-numeraire good q = Nz. Similarly, q = Nz. (Thus each merchant
owns one unit of labor, with the merchant group forming a fraction of N;N.)
Demand for the numeraire good is given by I=p   bq=p where I is aggregate
income, equal to Nw+S for the home country and Nw+S for the foreign
country. This income aggregate includes the income received by all agents
with national (home and foreign respectively) tastes, whether merchants or
workers in the trade services, export production or predatory activities.
The merchants' exercise of monopoly power now includes their ability to
exploit variation in the willingness to pay of consumers of the non-numeraire
good. Marginal revenue is given by Npf0(1 + zf00=f0) = Npf0(q=N) in
the home country. Integrating to form the merchants' (producers') surplus
yields
S(q;w;p) = Np(q=N)
(M + w=)   wa
q   wkq
1=: (20)
A similar expression describes the foreign surplus S. The merchant guild
understands the dependence of w on its choice of trade q as previously, but
it takes the numeraire price p as given.
The labor market clears with global supply equal to global demand. The
demand for labor includes that in trade services, kq1=, exports aq, and

















(1   M)D + (1   M)D
N + N + pD= + pD=   aq   aq   kq1=   k(q)1=;
where D = N(q=N) and D = N(q=N).
The numeraire goods market clears with the world endowment equal
to world demand. Using the expressions for merchants' surplus, the nu-




N + N   aq   aq   kq1=   k(q)1=
y + y + D(1   M   w=) + D(1   M   w=)
:
The simultaneous solution of w = W(q;q;p) and p = P(q;q;w) yields
the reduced form solution w = ~ W(q;q) and p = ~ P(q;q). Assuming the
stability condition WpPw < 1 is met, both w and p are increasing in both q
and q.
With this general equilibrium machinery working in the background, the
choice of q;q by the merchant guilds proceeds as in the partial equilibrium
setting. The conditions for the weak or strong enforcement regimes change,
as explained in the Appendix, but the qualitative implications remain the
same. There is a slight tension because the general equilibrium derivative
~ Wq incorporates the endogenous determination of p while the merchant guild
is assumed to take p as given. The merchant guild may instead use Wq in
setting its quantity policy. This dierence is, however, an inessential detail.
When equilibrium is secure, the labor market clearance condition above
implies that the wage is no longer a function of q;q directly. The model
solves for the relative prices p=w;b=w;b=w and the quantities q;q. The
monopolists' power reduces to the standard power over the buyers' willing-
ness to pay, taking the numeraire good's relative price in terms of labor as
given. Demands for the non-numeraire good being independent across mar-
kets, strategic independence characterizes the interaction of merchant guilds
and there is no role for strategic trade policy.
328.2 Comparative Statics of Equilibrium
8.2.1 Competitive Trade
Competitive trade volume is determined by Sq = 0. Then since Sqc =
 1, dq=dc = 1=Sqq. Dierentiating with respect to M yields d2q=dcdM =
 S 2
qq [SqqM + Sqqqdq=dM]. Evaluating Sqq shows that its dependence on M
comes through its dependence on w. Noting that WM =  W=(1   M) and
hence WqM =  Wq=(1   M), SqqM < 0. Moreover, dq=dM > 0 and Sqqq < 0
ordinarily and necessarily so if SwWqq < 0. Then dq=dc is ordinarily increas-
ing algebraically, becoming less responsive in absolute value, the greater is
M.
8.2.2 Monopoly Trade
A guild that controls trade volume chooses an interior volume where:
 Sq=Sw = Wq:
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate. Characterizing the equilibrium depends on the
shape of the iso-surplus contours. This is determined by two limiting values
of the derivatives of the surplus function. Sw = 0 ) qw = (b=k)
=(1 ) :
All iso-surplus contours asymptotically approach qw. Evaluating Sq = 0 at
the secure equilibrium wage w = (1   M);







The case q0 > qw implies that the interior equilibrium is associated with
Sq > 0: Manipulating the expressions for qw and q0; Sq > 0 if and only if
M > 1    + c=b while Sq < 0 if and only if M < 1    + c=b: These are
the strong enforcement and weak enforcement cases respectively.
It is straightforward to show that the curvature of the surplus function
in the two cases is as depicted in Figures 2 and 3.
Interior equilibrium requires that the second order condition is met, and
that positive prots are earned. It is possible that autarky is the only stable
equilibrium or that secure trade is the only stable equilibrium. See Anderson
and Bandiera for more discussion of existence in a closely related model in
which all qualitative issues are the same. (In that model, a monopoly enforcer
33provides M and maximizes prots by pricing enforcement sold to competitive
traders.)
The eect of a change in c is shown graphically in the two gures. For
the monopoly case, the comparative static derivative is given by dq=dc =
1=[Sqq + SwqWq + SwWqq].
As with the competitive case, the eect of M on the marginal response
arises through its eect on the wage along with the eect of M on q. It can
be shown that the denominator is decreasing in M provided that SwWqq > 0
and additionally if SwWqqq < 0. These are oversucient conditions. Thus
trade is ordinarily less responsive to reductions in c the larger is M.
8.2.3 Monopoly in General Equilibrium
The surplus contours of the monopolist in (w;q) space are shaped qual-
itatively like those of the partial equilibrium case. Evaluating the limit-
ing values of the general equilibrium surplus function (20) at Sw = 0 and














This implies that the critical condition is
M > (<)1    + 
a
!b=(1   )   a:
Compared to the partial equilibrium condition characterizing weak and strong
enforcement regimes, c=b is replaced by c=[b c] where  = !( M)b=(1 
);c = aw;   M = w=. Unlike the partial equilibrium condition, the
variable b on the right hand side is a (decreasing) function of q, so the condi-
tion holds under unspecied deeper relationships among the parameters that
determine equilibrium. Otherwise it has qualitatively similar implications.
34Figure 1. Competitive Trade q



















































































39Table 2. Composite Security Scores 
IMPORTER  Score  IMPORTER  Score  IMPORTER  Score 
Russia  -2.614  Italy  -0.362  France  0.689 
Ukraine  -2.377  Indonesia  -0.284  Australia  0.704 
Venezuela  -2.218  India  -0.264  Sweden  0.779 
Colombia  -2.098  Zimbabwe  -0.240  Austria  0.807 
Greece  -1.195  Peru  -0.235  Denmark  0.857 
Poland  -0.858  Korea  -0.217  Ireland  0.864 
Thailand  -0.796  China  -0.184  Germany  0.931 
Jordan  -0.794  Belgium-Luxembourg  0.055  New Zealand  0.997 
Hungary  -0.791  Egypt  0.227  United Kingdom  1.034 
Mexico  -0.749  Spain  0.382  Netherlands  1.036 
South Africa  -0.602  Portugal  0.391  Canada  1.050 
Argentina  -0.579  Iceland  0.451  China: Hong Kong  1.134 
Turkey  -0.539  Malaysia  0.499  Norway  1.142 
Slovak Republic  -0.524  Japan  0.562  Switzerland  1.159 
Brazil  -0.521  United States  0.651  Finland  1.173 
Czech Republic  -0.452  Chile  0.680  Singapore  1.241 
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